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Administrative Law.  Rollingwood Acres, Inc. v. Rhode Island 
Department of Environmental Management, 212 A.3d 1198 (R.I. 
2019).  Pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice for Small 
Businesses and Individuals Act (EAJA), an agency must reimburse 
a plaintiff for litigation expenses when the agency’s actions are not 
substantially justified.1 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
Rollingwood Acres, Inc. (Rollingwood) owns property located on 
Route 7 in Smithfield, Rhode Island (the property), on which 
Smithfield Peat Co., Inc. and Smithfield Crushing Co., LLC 
(collectively, Plaintiffs) operate their businesses.2  Smithfield Peat 
obtained a permit from the Rhode Island Department of 
Environmental Management (DEM) to alter freshwater wetlands.3 
In order to comply with the requirements of the permit, Smithfield 
Peat had to use fifteen-inch-diameter discharge pipes in their 
drainage structure, which cost the company $100,000 and took two 
years to construct.4  During a project to improve Route 7, the Rhode 
Island Department of Transportation (DOT) switched the fifteen-
inch-diameter pipe with an eighteen-inch-diameter pipe.5  The 
switch caused the drainage system to discharge more turbid water 
than permitted into a nearby stream and, in 1996, a DOT employee 
filed a complaint with the DEM about this issue.6  On June 3, 1997, 
the DEM issued a Notice of Intent to Enforce (NOIE) requiring the 
1. Rollingwood Acres, Inc. v. R.I. Dep’t of Envtl. Mgmt., 212 A.3d 1198,
1212 (R.I. 2019). 
2. Id. at 1200. “Smithfield Peat operates a leaf and yard waste
composting facility at the property” and “Smithfield Crushing operates a rock 
crushing facility at the property.”  Id. 
3. Id.
4. Id. at 1200–01.
5. Id. at 1201.
6. Id.  Turbid water is sediment-laden water.  Id.
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Plaintiffs to alter their drainage structure, but the Plaintiffs did not 
take action and the DEM did not enforce the NOIE.7 
On February 9, 2005, a DEM site inspector revisited the 
property while in the area on another inspection and noticed an 
“oily sheen” in one of the Plaintiffs’ retention ponds.8  The site 
inspector notified the Plaintiffs and they immediately hired a 
company to contain and clean up the oil discharge.9  The DEM 
performed follow-up testing and sampling on the property.10  The 
first set of samples could not be used because they were taken from 
an unconnected stream.11  The second set of samples were taken 
downstream, instead of upstream.12  
The DEM issued a Notice of Violation on November 6, 2006, 
which charged the Plaintiffs with violating the Rhode Island Water 
Pollution Act, DEM’s Water Quality Regulations, the Rhode Island 
Oil Pollution Control Act, DEM’s Oil Pollution Control Regulations, 
and DEM’s Regulations for the Rhode Island Pollution Discharge 
Elimination System.13 The Plaintiffs appealed to the 
Administration Adjudication Division (AAD) and an administrative 
hearing was held five years later.14  The Plaintiffs filed a motion to 
dismiss for failure to join the DOT as a party and the motion was 
denied.15 
On June 27, 2012, the AAD hearing officer issued a Merits 
Decision dismissing all but two of the Plaintiffs’ violations because 
the DEM had not met its burden of proof.16  The hearing officer 
dismissed the water pollution violations because the DEM’s 
background samples “were not taken in accordance with the Water 
Quality Regulations and [were] of no use in proving a turbidity 
violation.”17  The hearing officer also opined that “[a]fter hearing 






12. Id. at 1201–02.
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were victimized by [DOT].”18  On the separate issue of the alleged 
oil pollution violations, the hearing officer found that the Plaintiffs 
were liable under a strict liability theory because they received 
products contaminated with oil and were responsible for the oil 
discharge, but the administrative penalty was reduced from 
$31,470 to $2,615.19  Both parties appealed the Merits Decision to 
the Superior Court, which subsequently dismissed these appeals.20 
Under the EAJA and Rule 1.20 of the DEM’s ADD Rules, the 
Plaintiffs filed a request for litigation expenses on July 27, 2012.21  
The hearing officer denied the Plaintiffs’ request because he found 
that the Plaintiffs were not “parties” under the EAJA.22  The 
Plaintiffs appealed to the Superior Court, which found that the 
Plaintiffs were “parties” under the EAJA and remanded the case, 
instructing the AAD to determine the merits of the Plaintiffs’ 
litigation expenses claim.23  The hearing officer denied the 
Plaintiffs’ request, finding that DEM had acted with substantial 
justification.24  The Plaintiffs again appealed to the Superior Court, 
which upheld the AAD’s denial of reasonable litigation expenses.25  
The Plaintiffs subsequently petitioned  the Rhode Island Supreme 
Court (the Court) for a writ of certiorari, which was granted.26   
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
The Court reviewed the trial justice’s denial of the Plaintiffs’ 
motion for reasonable litigation expenses under the EAJA.27  In 
doing so, the Court applied a de novo standard of review because 
the case involved a question of law.28  The Court explained that the 
EAJA permitted individuals and small businesses to recover 
reimbursement for reasonable litigation expenses when an agency 
18. Id. at 1203.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. (citing 42 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-92-4 and 250-10-00 R.I. Code R.
§ 1.20).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1203–04.




28. Id. at 1205–1206.
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committed an action without substantial justification.29  The 
determining factor in this analysis is whether the administrative 
agency was “substantially justified in its actions.”30  The Court 
noted that substantial justification requires “the initial position of 
the agency, as well as the agency’s position in the proceedings, [to 
have] a reasonable basis in law and fact.”31  The Court further 
noted that other courts look to the underlying merits decision to 
determine whether the agency’s position was substantially 
justified.32 
The Court first examined whether the 1996 complaint served 
as a reasonable basis for issuing the 2006 NOV.33  The Court 
recognized that the DEM would generally have authority to 
investigate complaints and that hearing officers can deny a 
petitioner’s request for litigation expenses if “the division was 
charged by statute with investigating a complaint that led to the 
adjudicatory proceeding.”34  However, the Court found that there 
was not a sufficient relationship between the 1996 complaint and 
the 2006 NOV to allow DEM to claim it was substantially 
justified.35  The Court reasoned that DEM did not take action after 
the initial 1996 complaint, but rather revived its action against the 
Plaintiffs only after one of its site inspectors visited the property 
while he was in the area investigating an unrelated complaint.36 
Next, the Court reviewed the trial justice’s finding that the 
DEM’s actions were nonetheless substantially justified, despite the 
fact that they were not a direct result of the complaint.37  The Court 
reviewed this finding by analyzing three arguments raised by the 
Plaintiffs.38  The Plaintiffs first argued that DEM knew and had 
evidence that DOT was responsible for the pipe change.39  The 
29. Id. at 1204 (citing 42 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-49-1(a)–(b)).
30. Id. at 1205 (citing 42 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-92-3).
31. Id. (citing 42 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-92-2(7)).
32. Id. (citing Or. Nat. Res. Council v. Madigan, 980 F.2d 1330,1331–32
(9th Cir. 1992); Kali v. Bowen, 854 F.2d 329, 332 (9th Cir. 1988); Tarbox v. 
Zoning Bd. of Review of Jamestown, 142 A.3d 191, 198 (R.I. 2016)).  
33. Id. at 1206.
34. Id. at 1209.
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Court noted that DEM knew DOT ignored environmental 
regulations in the past and that DEM had little evidence when they 
issued the NOV.  The Court stated that an agency’s failure to review 
all the evidence before issuing an NOV is precisely the type of 
governmental abuse the EAJA was intended to remedy.40  The 
Court concluded that DEM knew or should have known of DOT’s 
involvement and, as such, should have held DOT responsible, not 
the Plaintiffs.41   
The Plaintiffs next argued that although DEM knew its water 
samples could not support a legally viable claim, the agency 
improperly issued the NOV nonetheless.42  The hearing officer had 
found DEM’s water samples were irrelevant because they were not 
valid upstream samples.43  Accordingly, the Court found that the 
lack of valid samples was further evidence that DEM did not have 
substantial justification.44   
Finally, the Plaintiffs argued that DEM had no basis for 
issuing the two dismissed oil pollution violations.45  The Court 
pointed out that there was no evidence the Plaintiffs were aware of 
the oil spills before the notification was issued, and that the 
Plaintiffs began cleaning up as soon as they received notice of the 
oil spill.46  Thus, the Court found that DEM failed to demonstrate 
it acted with substantial justification in regard to its actions leading 
up to the adjudicatory proceeding.47 
COMMENTARY 
The Court was fairly quick to dismiss DEM’s argument that it 
had a reasonable basis for issuing the violation because the 
Plaintiffs failed to report the oil spill immediately.48  Instead, the 
Court concluded that DEM did not have a reasonable basis because 
“the record [was] devoid of any evidence that plaintiffs were aware 
40. Id. at 1211.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1210.
43. Id. at 1211.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1210.
46. Id. at 1212.
47. Id.
48. See id. at 1211–1212.
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of the contamination before that time.”49  However, there was 
evidence that the Plaintiffs registered with the EPA as a small-
quantity generator of oil, which tends to show that there was 
evidence the Plaintiffs at least should have known about the oil 
discharge.50  The Court even noted that the trial justice had relied 
on this evidence to conclude that DEM had a reasonable basis for 
believing the Plaintiffs knew about the oil discharge before DEM’s 
discovery.51  Thus, the Court should have addressed whether or not 
the Plaintiffs should have known about the oil discharge.   
Regardless of whether the Plaintiffs had actual knowledge of 
the oil discharge, it is likely that a small-quantity generator of oil 
is responsible for monitoring its oil discharge levels, which would 
make it more likely that the DEM had a reasonable basis for 
believing that the Plaintiffs failed to report the spill immediately.52  
If DEM had a reasonable basis for issuing the violation, then it 
would have been substantially justified in its actions.53  
Accordingly, if DEM was substantially justified in in its actions, 
then it would not be responsible for reimbursing the Plaintiffs for 
reasonable litigation expenses in regard to this particular 
violation.54  
CONCLUSION 
The Court concluded that DEM acted without substantial 
justification when pursuing various charges against the 
Plaintiffs.55  The Court remanded the case to the Superior Court 
with directions to grant the Plaintiffs $69,581.25 in attorney’s fees 
and $5,628.75 for the stenographic records.56  
Tiffany L. Wallace 
49. Id. at 1211.
50. See id. at 1210.
51. Id.
52. See id. at 1204 (citing 42 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-92-2(7)).
53. See id.
54. See id. at 1204 (citing 42 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-49-1(a) and (b)).
55. Id. at 1212.
56. Id.
